ABYEI AREA AT THE CROSSROADS: centrepiece of unity, eyeball of disunity?

By: Abdalbasit Saeed, 8 Sept. 2007

INTRODUCTION

1. The ensuing discussion does not address the social-historical genesis and complications of Abyei Area Conflict. It rather looks into the implications of the Protocol on the Resolution of Abyei Conflict (PRAC) for the people of the area, the Misiriya and the Ngok-Dinka, towards the end of the Interim Period-and-after. Both the Misiriya and the Ngok-Dinka accept the PRAC. The Misiriya are categorically opposed to the ABC Report. The predicament is that Abyei Territory has, thus, become transformed into ‘a dysfunctional problem of the state formation’ much more than it is ‘a problem for the functioning of local communities’ who live there. What are the missed opportunities?
2. In the eyes of other stakeholders, particularly the Trioka Countries and the UN family who view both the PRAC and the ABC Report as binding documents to the NCP and SPLM, the major Partners to the CPA have wasted much valued time at a defunct renegotiating exercise on ‘peace’. They failed to do the obvious for more than two years, due to continued ‘hair-splitting’ in pursuit of ‘solutions’ the NCP and the SPLA think are pertinent. They are providing the evidence to external stakeholders that the burden of unity has become too heavy for them to carry together, short of continued third party assistance. Thus ‘the ailing boat’ could swing either way, depending on how strong and united are the social forces ‘winds’ of change: for or against the grand objective of “making unity attractive”?
3. The view, here, is that the situation in Abyei Area has gradually changed into a function of disarticulation of the State apparatus. The primary threat for peace, from the view point of the Ngok-Dinka, is the spread of small arms and the availability of ammunitions in the hands of the Misiriya and Dinka. Much worse, is that arms and ammunitions remained unchecked since the end of organized hostilities and that government authorities, in the absence of Abyei Administration foreseen in the CPA, have been unable to control them. For the Misiriya who are categorically opposed to ABC Report, the primary issue is that the outcome of adopting and implementing it would eventually threaten their livelihoods and survival through alienating them from dry-season water sources at the Ragaba-zarga. In the context of such perceived jeopardy, on the one hand and conjugal peace with the PRAC, on the other, the paper attempts to map out core issues and challenges and identify key stakeholders involved in Abyei Area, within the context of uncertain future for Southwestern Kordofan. While the principal stakeholders (NCP, SPLM and Oil Companies) do have their eyes on the lucrative oil resources, more than on the welfare of the people in SKS, WKZ and Abyei, they all must understand that the people of area, who are the real 'primary' stakeholders, could not be assumed for granted by any or all. Therefore, they must be treated as 'primary' stakeholders and must be duly streamlined in the implementation of the relevant protocols in order to ensure positive outcomes and impact.
4. A hasty jump to conclusions leads the author to make the following statements:
Firstly, the primary entry point, for arresting further deterioration and for addressing the contradictions, is to implement the CPA provisions without delay, while preparing local communities for positive responses. The Misiriya and Dinka are to be recognized as primary-stakeholders who may not be assumed for granted.
Secondly, and in order to overcome the challenges that make-up the uncertain future of Southwestern Kordofan: the backlog of the days of war has to be cleared, including through multi-facetted programs on recovery and reintegration covering socio-cultural, socio-economic, political, administrative and legal reforms that must be consultative and people-centered.
Thirdly, the principal Parties must be prepared to accommodate 'new' innovative ideas and viable political solutions. This is necessary for building mutual trust, in order to consolidate peace and "make national unity attractive". Otherwise, the road would be dotted with potentially unpleasant episodes that could make Southwestern Kordofan degenerate into violent conflict of immeasurable consequences.
Fourthly, the corollary is that NCP and SPLM, therefore, must be quick learners, in re-educating and re-training themselves into accepting 'new' innovative ideas and viable political solutions. This is simply because 'the negotiating-table context' where the CPA provisions were born had been vastly at variance with 'the practical implementation context'. The issue of Abyei Area poses itself as 'the litmus test' for the latter. For example, the CPA stipulates that areas where there are oil-related installations must remain demilitarized and overseen by the JIUs. Of course there are communities indigenous to such areas: what are their rights? Is it not high time for the NCP and SPLM, instead of recourse to the IGAD mediators, to seriously consider whether southwestern Kordofan, the cradle of strategic oil reserves, could be a better place for Misiriya and Dinka to live in harmony, if the area is redefined a demilitarized buffer zone. This could be contemplated within or without a revamping of the PRAC.

LISTENING TO MISIRIYA AND NGOK-DINKA: old wisdom in new bottles
5. The paramount chief of the Misiriya intimated to the author that:
Firstly, the Misiriya have never been “the root cause” of the problem. They found ‘themselves’ caught up between two armies fighting each other during the First North-South War. They had to defend themselves, especially when they realized that their neighbors did take the side of one of the antagonists. Self defense, being a legitimate option, they had to seek ‘protection’ from the other side. The eminent threat is still paramount, and will continue to be their biggest concern, so long as their livelihoods– the substance of being - is endangered by the ABC Report. Secondly, that they shared the land with the Dinka for more than three centuries and settled all disputes on the basis of custom and tradition. They are predestined to share it, now and in the future. In the past, the Misiriya had no boundaries vis-à-vis the Dinka, and would not accept boundaries now. Thirdly, the Misiriya know little about oil economics, but they are certain that oil-related issues are in the hearts and minds of both the antagonists. Fourthly, that the Misiriya are no longer certain as to whether the Dinka do want to live together with them, like in the good old days, and share all that their land has been giving them. They could share the land through peaceful co-existence based on the commonality of interests and on the basis of the age-old standing customary norms and traditions of their forefathers. Fifthly, the ABC Experts’ Report has not proven that the Misiriya were ‘ensalvers’. In the same vain, during the hostilities in the area the Misiriya were never ‘the belligerents’, they were acting in self-defense all along.
6. As to the views from the side of the Ngok-Dinka, the author sat for hours with all the Nine Dinka Chiefs. They also believed that they were victims to a siege imposed by the two opposing armies. They added that the same two armies are still staying around. However, the concerns of the Dinka Chiefs were not about the distant past, but rather that: Firstly, non-implementation of the PRAC – literally – equals “NO Peace for the people of Abyei”. They must be availed with the administration for Abyei foreseen in the CPA. Secondly, the people of Abyei Area want to see results of the ‘original text’ of the PRAC on the ground rather than the supplements that were inserted into it. Thirdly, sitting to discuss issues with the Misiriya only comes second to the implementation of the PRAC. In the event, the basis for sitting to deliberate on ‘points for the future’ must be made clear well in advance.

Land Marks in the Present Context of Southwestern Kordofan
7. Southwestern Kordofan, recognized in the CPA as ‘the former West Kordofan component’, with an area of 62.000 km2 including Abyei Area, has been merged with the ‘the former South Kordofan component’; i.e., the Nuba Mountains, in accordance with the SKS Protocol. It had autonomous development for eleven years as part of the defunct West Kordofan State. It is therefore, an object for administrative reintegration into SKS during the interim period. However, Southwestern Kordofan is being pulled in different directions: the SPLM-Nuba is pulling eastwards, for the fact that Lagawa Locality is designated as part of the Nuba Mountains, in order to grab a share of the lucrative oil revenues. The SPLM-South Sudan is pulling Southwestern Kordofan to the south and holding it captive to the PRAC, in order to win the contested oil-rich Abyei area. The NCP/Northern Sudan governing elite not only define Southwestern Kordofan as the strategic district in view of the rich oil and mineral resource base, but also for maintaining it as a buffer zone in the case of return to hostilities. Abyei Area is geographically aligned to the jigsaw movement (pull-and-push) for oil resources of the area. The population Southwestern Kordofan (500.000, including Abyei Area) is divided, in terms of political allegiance, among the sectarian Umma Party, the NCP and SPLM-Nuba Chapter such as in Lagawa County. All in all, the Misiriya are a longtime ally of the central government authority, irrespective of the form of the governing regime in Khartoum. The majority of the Misiriya are satisfied with merger into SKS. They insist on equitable treatment regarding their shares from oil revenue as per CPA. If this is not fulfilled, it could lead to complications. However, the chances for the Misiriya to make alliances with neighbors (Nuba and Daju to the East, or Ngok-Dinka to the South) towards any armed resistance are weak, because of mistrust on account of Misiriya past alliance with the central government.
8. Prolonged conflict, man-made crises that are socio-political and historically determined have devastated livelihoods systems and precipitated deep-seated ideological/ stereotypical, social and geographic dichotomies among peoples of Southern Kordofan State (SKS), leading to a fractured political landscape. An imminent scenario is that the virgin and resourceful area of southwestern Kordofan, with high development potential, with oil and minerals, vast land and forest, would attract massive population movements of investors and speculators in up-coming years. The current population density of only 5-6 persons/km2 would soon be overwhelmed by immigrants and labor migrants. The pastoralist Misiriya and Dinka would be left alone to roam about. They must learn to settle and transform their small villages and camps in to primary market settlements. Hence, large urban settlements would rise in advantageous areas. New forms of land tenure, in place of the fluid usufructuary practices of today, would be established ‘hot house’ in pursuit of capital gain through land rent and mercantilist appropriation of surplus product. ‘Get rich soon’ would be the slogan. It would be the central dynamic for incoming speculators and investors, including the capitalist state form.
9. The expected trend for the future would, of course, find justification in the national free market policy of liberalization and, particularly, privatization of land and property rights. As of 2005, when the CPA was signed, 450.000 fedan of arable land in the lower Wadi-Shelengo valley had been given-out by the government, since 1992, as leasehold property to large-scale mechanized farming ‘land-miners’. Abyei might follow soon. This trend is not expected to be halted unless the junior Partner stands firm on its reversal. This time, however, the national government could not afford to ignore the rights of the people of southwestern Kordofan with respect to land leases and investment opportunities. The Ngok-Dinka expect that SPLM would protect their land. Attempts at demarcation of rain-fed mechanized farms, similar to the experience of the 1960s, could not be allowed to resurface. Of course, in the post-conflict peace building and consolidation process, agricultural land must be surveyed and mapped with a view to equitable allocation and equitable land use opportunities.

UPHOLDING PRAC, DISPENSING WITH ABC: positions of stakeholders
10. The cantonment of Abyei Area had been under the jurisdiction of the defunct West Kordofan State before the signing of the CPA. Presently, it is attached to the Presidency. Its fate would be determined by the referendum at the end of the Interim Period. The majority of Abyei residents are SPLM followers. Abyei is rich in oil resources, another important factor to CPA implementation. Abyei Area has been assigned a special administrative status under the PRAC. One important contribution of the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) Report is that it delineated, for the first time, the total land area of the contested territory of Abyei Area (18,626 km2). The total area of southwestern Kordofan will, therefore, change to 125.400 km2. However, the estimated 50,000 people and a population density of 3-4 persons per km2 presents a challenge for outreach by the future Abyei Area government in respect of coverage with basic social services. Non-adoption of ABC Report, by the Presidency, is currently the number-one hurdle, and most immediate threat, to CPA. The fact that the PRAC has yet to be implemented by the Presidency after the lapse of more than two years, implicates the Presidency for blocking implementation of the CPA. It could lead to resumption of hostilities. Abyei Area would not remain as part of southwestern Kordofan. It has an autonomous legal administrative status, enshrined in the CPA, even if it chooses to stay in the North at the point of the referendum.
Defining the Predicament of the ABC Report:
11. Perhaps the problem with the ABC Report is twofold: Firstly, whereas the Experts delineated and demarcated boundaries as they appeared to them from documentary and circumstantial evidence as of 1905, all political stakeholders (NCP, SPLA, and partly Misiriya and Ngok-Dinka) seem to understand the identified boundaries as if they are the boundaries that must be in place today, (2005). Mindful of such incomprehension, the Experts underline it as "popular misunderstanding about the impact of establishing a boundary". Secondly, the NCP and Misiriya stakeholders seem to believe that findings that are based on scrupulous scientific procedures must coincide with political predispositions they hold. On the other hand, the NCP and SPLM seem to assume that correctness (political and scientific) remains what they intended it to be. In the authors’ view this is misplaced conception, simply because solutions that are politically practicable, sound and acceptable (to NCP and SPLM) do not have to coincide with what could be a scientifically correct statement of the situation.
12. Due to lack of an agreed mechanism, that is politically empowered by the two principal Parties, to address such differences on implementation of PRAC, the NCP and the SPLM held a joint meeting (27-29 May 2006) of their political leadership and established the High Political Committee, and sub-committees on pending political and economic issues. These committees have been deadlocked for over twelve months.
13. It has become clear to date, in view of statements made by the two principal Parties that the Presidency has officially declined to adopt the ABC Report presented on 14 July 2005. Rather, the two Parties have said ‘goodbye’ to the ABC. Furthermore, the SPLM/A has publicly closed the door on ‘futile dialogue’ of the post-mortem-type. In fact, SPLM has ‘shouted huller’. The up-shot is that not only the implementation of the PRAC has been firmly dead-locked and that the CPA process has consequently been ‘jammed’, but also that enthusiasm of the Ngok-Dinka for peace has been put on ‘hold’, at least temporarily. Therefore statements which morn the non-implementation of the PRAC as overdue by more than two years have already become non-productive.
14. However, the press record tells that the NCP has declined to accept ABC final report on four counts:
That the ABC experts have overstepped their mandate. Upon reading the ABC report, the author finds no justification to share the NCP position.
That the ABC experts have not discussed the Report with the Presidency. The author’s observation is that the ABC terms of reference and the rules of procedure do not require from the ABC experts to ‘discuss … with’, but rather to ‘present to’ the Presidency.
That the NCP claims that the text submitted is only a draft and that it is not the final report of the ABC. This claim is ill-founded because the experts submitted a ‘final and binding decision’.
Tat the NCP raises the question: is the text ‘a report of the experts’ or ‘the ABC report’? The author’s response is that the terms of reference and the rules of procedure for the ABC specify that the experts will write the report if the two Parties fail to reach a decision by consensus.
15. Therefore, the author observes that the report is the legitimate outcome of a constitutional instrument, the ABC. The view, here, is that the basic precondition for 'correctness' of the Report is that it "… shall be based on scientific analysis and research." The description of research methods, of information gathering and data collection, scrutiny and analysis show that the report is objective, clear and has fulfilled field requirements of procedure as stipulated in the four basic reference documents.


UN AGENCIES
Troika Countries
UN Funding Agencies
International NGOs
Humanitarian Action
International Oil Exploration Companies
Countries of Origin
Sudan Associates












Central Govt.
SAF/ PDF



ABYEI OIL
GOSS
SPLM / SPLA
42%Abyei Oil











MISIRIYA
2% of Abyei oil
Transhumance amps
Livestock vs crops
Pasture availability


NGOK-DIKA
2% of Abyei oil
Towns/villages
Livestock
patoralists
UN MONITORS










ABYEI AND THE POST-INTERIM-PERIOD (APIP)
16. The divergence of views of the main actors (NCP and SPLM) and the junior stakeholders (Misiriya and Ngok-Dinka), as secondary partners, has given rise to a situation the author describes as the ‘Post-Interim-Period Puzzle’ (PIP). In order to resolve the 'puzzle', it is imperative to redefine the Misiriya and Ngok-Dinka communities as primary stakeholders in their own territory.
17. Viewed from the Misiriya stand-point, it is likely that the puzzle is generated as 'an unintended consequence' of the time-bound TOR (1905) and temporary nature (6-years) of the ABC recommendations. The Misiriya think that the ABC recommendations attempt to resolve the Dinka-Ngok claims at the expense of the Misiriya. They add that everything will be 'hanging up in the air' pending the referendum on Abyei and on the South. If the results of the two referenda coincide, the Misiriya will face a 'catch-22'.
On the other hand, the Dinka-Ngok do not share the Misiriya concerns. They hold the view that the ABC is bound by the terms of reference, "define and demarcate" as of 1905. They add that the ABC is not mandated to resolve all types of claim; and that it is not fair to over-load the report with 'our' expectations of what the ABC aught to have done.
18. Hence, the APIP is a situation in which the Misiriya, long-time allies of the GOS, perceive that they will be the ultimate losers. They think that the NCP has sold out on them. Thus the Misiriya say that the ABC Report is final and binding decision only to the NCP and the SPLM. It addresses issues only in the context of the Interim Period. It does not present a solution to their problem after the lapse of the interim period. The Misiriya also ask: what is going to be done as regards complications that may occur after the lapse of the Interim Period? They suggest that a workable solution has to be found, including the redrawing of the borderline envisioned in the ABC Report. The Misiriya also think that the ABC Report alienates them from dry season water and grazing resources in (Ragaba-zerga/Gnol/ Bahr-al-Humr), a place they believe that they could not survive without reaching, in the dry season, failing which their cattle would be doomed to atrophy. They, further, believe that they not only deserve an equitable share of the natural water and grazing pasture resources of the area, but also the right to live, own property, and invest in the Ragaba-zerga/Gnol; a place they inhabited, with the Ngok-Dinka, for more than 300 years. They also think that, both as Sudanese citizens and as indigenous people of the area, they are entitled to free choice of the place of residence, a constitutional right denied to them, de facto, by the ABC report. Most importantly, the Misiriya say that if the ABC Report is implemented, as is, it would only create additional complications. It would set the area on fire and violence would return, this time, on the basis of sheer survival.
19. Most importantly: what is to be done in order to break the deadlock on Abyei? The scenario to break the deadlock could run as follows:
Firstly, the NCP, SPLM and the Presidency make and sign a tripartite supplementary understanding that separates ‘the adoption of the ABC Report’ from its ‘implementation’. Secondly, the NCP would present to the SPLM any reservations they may have on the ABC Report. Thirdly, as for implementation, the two Parties would negotiate and reach a compromise position with respect to any adjustment to the new boundary that has been identified by the ABC report, in such a manner that would allow the Misiriya unimpeded access to the Regaba-Zarga, including the right to live, invest and own property. Fourthly, the Dinka-Ngok should be compensated regarding land that goes to the Misiriya in order to reach the Regaba-Zarga: that is, along Kiek River towards Lake Kailek and along the railway line towards Latitude 10:35. Fifthly, the two Parties would recommend to the Presidency to transform the current top-down approach of the two principal Parties into a bottom-up one where the Misiriya and Ngok-Dinka communities would directly be involved as primary stakeholders in reaching an acceptable solution and reconfirming the proposed compensation. The Misiriya and Ngok-Dinka must, now, be redefined as the primary stakeholders involved in order to express their views on the future of Abyei. This is because both the Misiriya and Ngok-Dinka have been neglected for too long by the two Parties. This is important for avoiding the complexities mentioned above. This step, it should be understood, takes Abyei issue back to the Misiriya and the Ngok-Dinka within the context of the new boundary, without doing any harm to the ABC Report. Lastly, the two Parties would recommend to the Presidency an action plan and work schedule, to be elaborated in concurrence with the Presidency, including demilitarizing/disarming of the two communities, so that the tasks stipulated in Annex C2 of the PRAC could be implemented forthwith.

RECOMMENDATIONS
When the PRAC was signed with the promise of a sustained revenue flow to a politically autonomous local administration, it seemed that Abyei was positioned to play the model envisioned for it. It has not been forthcoming. Therefore, Responsible management of oil revenue and financial resources for both the Misiriya and Ngok-Dinka remains one instrument that would defuse feelings of animosity. It makes both sides feel that the peace dividend is real. Otherwise, it is a daunting challenge.
The absence of development plans for both parts of Southwestern Kordofan (WKZ and Abyei Area), presumably, owned by the local population, is a test case for starting on the road to failure in building peace.
Enforcement of the ABC findings, giving Misiriya only seasonal access in pursuit of grasing and pasture and denying them the right to live and own property is inimical to their survival. They will have to reach Ragaba-Zerga water sources in an unimpeded fashion.
The Parties and oil companies, as stakeholders, must be more sensitive to the interests of both the communities. They should work towards building peace through the forging of alliances among them around common interests. The first step in this direction could be a common platform for rights-based peace building.
Establishing a shared rights zone that does not include strategic planning for recovery of both communities would be detrimental to future harmony, if the Ngok-Dinka choose to stay in Southern Kordofan at the point of referendum.